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DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION
JAMES J. SCA VO*
I. INTRODUCTION
A community association' is created by a recorded declaration containing
a complex system of covenants on real property. These covenants establish
conduct guidelines for occupants of the dwellings in the community. In addi-
tion, these covenants authorize the community association to enforce these
guidelines in the event of a violation. Inevitably, there is a deviation from the
guidelines established by the covenenats and the problem arises of how the
community association will resolve the resulting dispute. Such dispute resolu-
tion is generally more delicate and emotional than resolving a dispute
between a landlord and a tenant since a community association dispute is
between neighbors who jointly own or use property and typically pits the
*B.A., State University of New York, 1973; J.D., St. John's University, 1976; member of
the Georgia Bar. The author is a practicing attorney with the law firm of Hyatt & Rhoads of
Atlanta, Georgia, and Washington, D.C., and is engaged substantially in working with con-
dominium and home owner associations and developers.
1. The term "community association" includes condominium and home owner associa-
tions. Both associations are "mandatory membership associations," that is an individual, on
the basis of his or her ownership of a unit in a condominium or a lot in a home owners associa-
tion, automatically becomes a member of the association. A basic difference in a condominium
and a home owner association is in a condominium the common property is owned in
undivided percentage interests by the individual owners and in a home owner association the
common property is owned by the association itself. In addition to a recorded declaration, a
condominium also is subject to the terms of a jurisdiction's condominium enabling statute. A
home owner association is solely supported by the recorded declaration of covenants.
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membership association against one of its members or a member's tenant.
There are numerous types of disputes which can arise in a commuity
association. Disputes have ranged from the typical complaints concerning a
dog or motor vehicle to complaints concerning a neighbor practicing witch-
craft2 or an exhibitionist neighbor visiting other neighbors. While each
dispute is unique, there are common themes which surface after reviewing
some actual association controversies. This Article will outline several
specific disputes that have taken place in associations and how the courts
have resolved these disputes, and then will outline several alternative pro-
cedures for resolving disputes in a community association which do not
require judicial intervention and litigation. By no means, however, will these
suggestions always prove effective.
II. EXAMPLES 3
For the last several years there has been an upswing in litigation concerning
internal disputes within a community association. This upswing may exist
because associations are maturing and growing more mindful of the require-
ments contained within their legal documents. The increased number of court
cases also may result from increased unit owner involvement in the associa-
tion, thus increasing the potential for interpersonal conflict. 4
Few recent cases have involved claims for monetary damages. Instead, the
cases typically have involved questions of the validity of association action,
taken by the board of directors or membership vote, or action taken by indi-
2. After careful review of the facts it was advised that the practice of witchcraft out of a unit
in the condominium was the operation of a business, especially since the homeowner practicing
witchcraft was carrying on seances for which third parties paid to be in attendance. Operating a
business from one of the units was expressly forbidden by the condominium documents. The
case never proceeded to litigation, however, since after receiving violation warning letters from
the association counsel, the owner who practiced witchcraft sold her unit and moved.
3. Many of the cases used as examples are reported in the CONIMUNITY ASS'N L. REP.
(CALR). The CALR is part of an ongoing program of education for persons involved in con-
dominiums, planned unit developments (PUD) and townhouse communities. It is published
monthly by the Community Associations Institute, 1832 M Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C., 20036. The Community Associations Institute is a national membership organization
formed to research and distribute information on the most advanced and effective ways to
establish, finance, operate and maintain the common facilities and services in condominiums,
PUD, and townhouse communities.
4. A prime reason for the increased internal conflict in the association is the failure of many
community association homeowners to understand the concept of the development in which
they live. Education of homeowners to the condominium form of ownership, for example,
traditionally has not been given serious attention during the sales period of the units.
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vidual members of the community association. The remedy generally sought
in these cases was either affirmative or restraining injunctive relief. A com-
mon thread between all cases, however, was that the judicial solution to the
conflict required time and money.
A. The Problem: A unit owner's architectural violation.
1. The Unwanted Change'
a. Raleigh Square Condominium Ass'n v. Womack. 6 The case
involved a woman who purchased a unit at the Raleigh Square Condo-
minium in August 1977. Soon thereafter, her roommate, who happened also
to be a sales agent for the developer, requested the board of directors to allow
her to add concrete sidewalks and "astroturf" outside the patio adjacent to
her unit. The sidewalks were to extend from the rear boundary of the patio to
an already existing common area sidewalk. The request was made in writing
to the board and cited certain sections of the condominium declaration which
were believed to authorize the board to allow the change. In response to this
request, the board of directors of the condominium association sought a legal
opinion to determine whether it had the authority to approve the change. The
advice was that the board's authority did not exist under the condominium
declaration since it contained no provisions which would allow the board to
approve individual homeowner improvements on the common area grounds
of the condominium. 7
5. The unwanted change, for the purposes of this Article, is a change which the association
opposes. Generally, the unwanted change results from the action of an individual homeowner
who decides to "improve" the common property without the consent of the proper parties,
such as, the board of directors, the architectural standards committee, or the membership,
depending upon the provisions of the association documents.
6. No. C-34427 (Ga. Super. Ct. of Fulton County 1978).
7. The defendant presupposed that the board of directors had the authority to approve the
request for the additions on the basis of the following covenants:
Whenever it is desired that structural changes or additions be made to the common areas
and facilities, the following provisions will control:
A. Required Vote.
If the vote to make any such change or addition is at least 75% or more of the total vote
of the Association, the proposed change or addition and the cost thereof shall be born by
the residence owners in their respective percentages of undivided interest in the common
areas of the facilities.
B. Excessive Additional Cost.
If the cost of such a change or addition is greater than 3076 of the total value of the pro-
perty in the condominium, any residence owner who voted against the change or addition
1979]
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The defendant, after notification of this advice, through her roommate,
began making improvements similar to those which originally were requested.
The improvements included concrete sidewalks extending from the rear of
the patio approximately ten feet to an existing concrete common area side-
walk. Additionally, some concrete was placed in a limited common planting
area. 8 After several unheeded warnings that the sidewalks must be removed,
the association had to resort to litigation since no other mechanism for
dispute resolution existed.
but was required to bear a proportionate amount of the cost may require the Association
to buy his residence at a price determined by appraisal.
Whenever a residence owner desires to make any change, alteration, or change in color
or paint or decor in his residence which will affect the exterior appearance of his residence,
he shall do so only at his own expense and after prior written consent of the Association.
Nothing herein shall be construed to require action by anyone other than the Board of
Directors by majority vote. Such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. In the event
a residence owner desires to make a structural change in this residence, he may do so only
at his own expense and only after 75% of the total vote of the Association (and the consent
of voting owners, which consents shall not be unreasonably withheld).
In addition, defendant relied on a paragraph in the by-laws which stated:
Powers and duties of the Board of Directors shall consist of those powers and duties
specified in the Act, the Declaration and these By-laws to be exercised and performed by
the Board of Directors, such powers and duties to include but not be limited to...
consideration and approval or disapproval of the exterior changes by the members of their
residences as provided in the Declaration.
In contrast to these covenants relied on by the defendant, other covenants contained in the
declaration were raised by the board of directors of the association. One of the covenants stated
that "there shall be no alteration or further improvement to the common area and facilities
except as provided in the Declaration." Additionally, the condominium statute to which the
condominium was submitted stated that "no owner shall do any work which would jeopardize
the soundness or safety of the property, reduce the value thereof or impair any easement or
hereditament without every such case the unanimous consent of all the other apartment owners
lien first obtained."
A hereditament is something capable of being inherited. Obviously, a condominium owner's
unit and interest in the common area is inheritable and, therefore, the unit and the interest in
the common area could be considered a hereditament. Arguably, since every owner has a right
to use the common area for its intended purposes, which could be construed as an easement to
use the common area, any permanent improvement added to the condominium's common area
could, perhaps, be considered something which "impairs.. .an easement and hereditament"
and would, therefore, require the unanimous consent of all the other unit owners.
8. By statute, limited common area in a condominium is generally defined as part of the con-
dominium common area which is limited in use to one or more but less than all condominium
units and owners. The area is, however, a common area still owned by all the condominium
homeowners in percentage interests. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1602(e)(r) & 1603(b)(j)
(1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-101(b)(1) (1974); VA. CODE § 55-79.41(g) (1978).
[Vol. 17:295
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One issue arising from the situation was whether the defendant could
legally install the concrete sidewalks in light of the covenants contained in the
condominium declaration. Additionally, defendant raised several peripheral
issues, including whether the unauthorized sidewalk was considered in the
purchase price of her unit and, therefore should be allowed.
When the defendant homeowner did not respond to the association's
lawsuit, the association moved for a default judgment. In March 1978, the
condominium association received a default judgment requiring the violating
homeowner to remove the concrete sidewalks. The case, however, did not
terminate there for defendant homeowner moved to set aside the default
judgment, raising several grounds in her motion.9
At the initial hearing of the motion the trial judge suggested he could not
make a decision whether to set aside his original default judgment until he
viewed the premises. "I After viewing the premises, he allowed both parties the
opportunity to argue their cases and entered his final order requiring the
homeowner to remove the concrete sidewalk. The judge correctly resolved
the dispute. He found that a breach of a covenant on the common area of the
condominium could be cured by injunctive relief and that installation of the
concrete sidewalk violated a covenant restricting unauthorized improvements
on the common area of the condominium and thus entitled the plaintiff-
association to summary relief as a matter of law."
9. These grounds included (1) that the board of directors did not represent the members of
the condominium association; (2) that the sidewalk was construed by the developer's agents
prior to defendent consummating ownership of the condominium and that such sidewalk was
considered in the sales price, the appraisal and the mortgage on defendant's unit; (3) that other
sidewalk alterations existed on the common area adjacent to several townhouses similar to
defendant's; and (4) that the association's action represented an unfair singling out of and
discrimination against the defendant without just cause. Raleigh Square Condominium Ass'n
v. Womack, No. C-34427 (Ga. Super. Ct. of Fulton County 1978).
10. Whether this was within the authority of the trial judge was not a contested issue since all
parties wished only to resolve the question of the sidewalk.
11, In addition to these findings, the judge made certain findings on the items outlined in
note 9 supra. He held that the statute applicable to the condominium allowed the board of
directors to proceed in the litigation and that the board of directors and the association were
entitled to have the sidewalk removed; that the purchase price of a condominium unit included
the value of a unit plus its percentage interest in the common area and that the purchaser of a
unit in a condominium could not validly claim that the purchase price included an unauthorized
common area improvement, which violates a covenant in a condominium declaration.
The covenants did not allow the board of directors to authorize the improvement. The word-
ing of the covenants is such that Paragraph A of the covenants outlined in note 7 supra would
allow 75% of the total vote of the association to approve an association improvement. This is
obviously the case since Paragraph A speaks in terms of the cost being borne by all the residence
owners and not only by the residence owner requesting a change. Also, Paragraph B implies
19791
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b. Nugent v. Lake Village Homeowners Ass'n. 12 In this case
plaintiff-homeowner submitted to the board of directors a plan for the con-
struction of a deck extending over the common area of the homeowners
association. 13 The association's architectural control committee became con-
cerned about the legality of allowing such an extention. The committee
decided to take no action on the application until a legal opinion could be
obtained. The board of directors of the association ratified this position.
Based on the legal opinion, which essentially stated the board of directors
could prohibit such encroachments,' 4 the association denied plaintiff's
that the changes contemplated are association, not individual, changes. Why else would the
association be required to buy out a dissenting owner unless the change made was an associa-
tion change?
In any case, the remaining parts of the paragraph clearly give no authority to the board of
directors to allow a structural change on the common area. The remaining parts of the covenant
allow the board of directors to approve a change in color of the paint or decor in all owner's
residences which will affect the exterior appearance of a residence. This provision does not
allow the board of directors to approve a change on the grounds of the condominium. Other-
wise, a structural change in the residence could only be perfected by receiving 75% of the total
vote of the association. Nowhere in this covenant is the board of directors on its own accord
allowed to approve a change on the common area grounds of the condominium.
The by-laws provision outlined in note 7 supra does not change this but instead verfies that
the board has the authority to approve exterior residence changes by the members. The by-law
provision does not speak in terms of-the common area grounds of the condominium.
On the other hand, the provision upon which the association relied clearly established that
the board of directors had no authority to approve the change since the changes on the common
area would only be allowed under the applicable provisions of the declaration. Nowhere in the
declaration was the board of directors given the authority to allow change on the common area
other than on the exterior of units.
12. No. 8288 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 1978).
13. This case involved a home owner association which owns the common area. In such cases
the association possibly could maintain a claim in trespass against a homeowner who uses the
common area in an unauthorized way. The author is familiar with a case which never pro-
ceeded to litigation in which a homeowner in a home owner association placed concrete blocks
and certain landscaping on the common area. The blocks and landscaping were viewed as
objectionable and a trespass on the common area by the board of directors. Because of this, the
board proceeded to have the landscaping and blocks removed and neatly placed on the home-
owner's patio despite threats by the homeowner that he would file suit against the association's
board of directors for discrimination if such action were taken. The homeowner felt there were
other similar violations existing on the common area. After weighing the risk involved with self-
help and the expense and time of suing for removal of the blocks and landscaping, the board
resorted to self-help. This was done, however, only after the board carefully considered preven-
tive measures needed to protect the homeowner's chattels and only after the jurisdiction's case
law was reviewed and found to support such self-help.
14. The legal opinion stated that the board of directors could prohibit all encroachments on
the common area. Alternatively, the opinion stated that the board could permit "minor
encroachments" of one or two feet onto the common area. The attorney also recommended
[Vol. 17:295
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request for the deck which was ten feet over the common elements.
Plaintiff then resubmitted the request several times before the board con-
sidered it and, then, referred it to counsel and proceeded to take no further
action. A month and a half later, the board, on the advice of its counsel, had
the declaration amended to permit limited encroachments over the common
area. The encroachments allowed, however, could not exceed three feet.
Thereafter, plaintiff sued the association in an attempt to have a court permit
plaintiff to construct a deck on the common area.
The court had to decide whether the board of directors was required to
approve plaintiff's request, since extensions over the common elements had
been approved in the past. Also, the court confronted the issue whether the
board acted arbitrarily and unreasonably for there was an apparent delay on
a decision in the instant matter while an amendment concerning the three-
foot extension was considered.
The court found in favor of defendant-Lake Village Homeowners
Ass'n. In an oral opinion, the court held the declaration contained no provi-
sion allowing private use of the common elements by an individual home-
owner. The court recognized that traditionally uniform minor encroach-
ments of less than three feet had been allowed and that these uniform
encroachments were not considered to be arbitrary or capricious. Similarly,
the court found that the only ten-foot type decks allowed were ones built on
private property of particular homeowners, and not those built over common
grounds of the association. Otherwise, common area encroachments did not
exceed three feet.
The court, while deciding for the association, indicated a concern and
interest in seeing this type of dispute resolved outside the court whenever
possible. Specifically, the judge stated:
I think that it is unfortunate that this matter could not have been
resolved in a more satisfactory manner. The location of this particular
deck appears to be in an area which would not create a great deal of
problem to the adjoining residence.. .The area which was desired to be
constructed over is an area which really appears to me to be not usable
for any particular purposes, and would possibly enhance his enjoy-
ment of his particular residence.. .To allow him to construct within
the guidelines prescribed by the Board.. .would be something that
would be in the best interest of all the parties concerned in this par-
ticular proceeding.
that guidelines be established if the board decided to permit "minor encroachments."
Establishing objective criteria on which approval of an architectural change will be based
reduces the risk of a board or a committee being accused of discrimination by the disgruntled
homeowner whose proposed change is denied.
1979)
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Although I must find for the defendants Association and against
the plaintiffs in my judgment in this matter, I simply point that out to
counsels and to the parties, because it seems to me that that is a solu-
tion that all of you could reasonably live with, as long as the ruling has
been made and the precedent has not, in fact, been established to allow
unwanted extension of buildings and decks, or any other private uses
of property, over common area in excess of three feet, which has
previously been specified. 'S
2. The Wanted Change 6
a. Grimes v. Moreland. 17 In this case, several condominium unit
owners desired to put in fences and air conditioning compressors on the
common area. The association membership amended the condominium
documents by a seventy-five percent vote of the unit owners, thus allowing
individual owners, upon receiving the consent of the board of directors, to
install on the common area fences or air conditioning compressors. 5 This
amendment was necessary because nowhere in the condominium documents
did the board of directors originally have the right or power to allow an indi-
vidual homeowner to make common area improvements.
One homeowner proceeded, after receiving written permission, to build a
redwood fence, roughly six feet high, enclosing a rectangular area on the
common area to the rear of his unit. Other homeowners received permission
to place air conditioning compressors on the common area of the con-
dominium. These compressors were two feet wide, three feet long and two
feet high. The problem was, however, that another homeowner objected to
these fences and air conditioning compressors.
The court stated the issues as (1) whether the placing of fences and air con-
ditioning compressors in the condominium common area constituted a
15. Oral opinion furnished by letter.
16. The "wanted change" is that change which the association desires to approve either for
the interests of all or for the particular benefit of a homeowner to alleviate an undue hardship.
For example, a condominium association wished to allow a homeowner to build a patio outside
the back of her unit so that her mother who was ill could be in the sunshine. The problem was
that the documents did not comtemplate any limited common area patio or any patio what-
soever and, further, restricted sunbathing or lounging on the common elements. To rectify this
situation there was proposed an amendment to the condominium declaration which required
unanimous consent for approval.
17. 41 Ohio Misc. 69, 322 N.E.2d 699 (Ct. Com. Pleas 1974).
18. In September 1971, the amendment was adopted and the board of directors proceeded to
entertain requests for fences and air conditioning compressors to be placed on the common
area by individual owners.
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"use" of the property requiring association board approval, (2) whether such
action was in compliance with the provisions of the declaration, amended by
a seventy-five percent vote of the unit owners, or (3) whether such action was
a "taking" of a percentage of each unit owner's undivided interest in com-
mon area property. If the placing of such fences and air conditioning com-
pressors constituted a "taking,' such action could have been authorized only
by a unanimously approved amendment to the association's declaration.
The court concluded that placing fences and air conditioning compressors
on the condominium common area constituted a taking of property and an
ouster of the condominium unit owners from a percentage of their undivided
interest in common areas. Therefore, in order to authorize such action, the
association membership had to unanimously vote to amend their declaration.
As correctly concluded by the court, under the condominium declaration,
and under the jurisdiction's condominium statute in effect at the time of the
case, allowing the erection of fixed objects on the common areas constituted
a taking of property which was the subject of the undivided interest of all
owners. To hold otherwise would have allowed the unit owners in control of
seventy-five percent of the association voting power to take the common area
from those with the remaining twenty-four percent by amending the declara-
tion. The correct conclusion, therefore, was that the installation of com-
pressors and the erection of fences, without unanimously approved amend-
ments to the declaration, was improper.
B. The Problem: Parking.
Holleman v. Mission Trace Home-owners Ass'n.'9 Under a recorded
declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions, the board of directors
had the right to adopt certain parking rules. This declaration was consistent
with the San Antonio, Texas ordinance on planned unit developments. Addi-
tionally, these documents indicated that the owners had a guaranteed right to
at least two parking spaces, as well as an easement of enjoinment in the
association common area. The board of directors adopted restrictions on
parking in driveways after the individual plaintiff-unit owner had purchased
his home. The unit owner disagreed with the restrictions on parking in the
driveway.
The issue in the case was whether the association's board of directors had a
right to regulate parking in the driveway adjacent to the association's lots.
The court upheld the board's authority to restrict parking in driveways. The
rule adopted by the board was within its authority to make "reasonable
rules." The court found that the driveways were common areas except for
19. 556 SW.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
19791
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thirteen feet owned individually by one homeowner which was beyond the
jurisdiction of the board's regulation. Expressly, the court stated that the
planned unit developments "present a relatively new and unique concept in
cooperative living because of its mini-government which is empowered pur-
suant to its Declaration and By-laws to enact rules and regulations' 20
C. The Problem: Sales or Leases, including the Right of First Refusal.
1. Leases
a. Glenvale Condominium v. Driscoll. " Plaintiff, a member of a
condominium association, disagreed with the association's position requiring
each owner who sought to lease a unit to submit certain information
including name, address, telephone number of the proposed leasee and a
copy of the lease agreement, prior to the lease being consummated. This pro-
vision was contained in the association's by-laws. Plaintiff challenged this
provision as an invasion of his privacy.
The issue was whether the association could require certain information
concerning who was to occupy a unit. Basically, this provision is necessary so
that the association will know who resides on the premises. For reasons such
as security, this provision is important to many associations.
The court, ruling in favor of the association, held that the provision con-
cerning leasing was "completely reasonable" since each individual had to
comply with its terms and conditions. A mandatory injunction was issued
and plaintiff was required to submit the leasing information to the associa-
tion.
b. Seagate Condominium Ass'n v. Duffy.2 2 Condominium
owners amended their condominium declaration to add a restriction concern-
ing the leasing of units. The amendment was approved by ninety-six percent
of the association members. The plaintiff unit owner did not object to the
amendment until it was implemented against her. The amendment to the
declaration prohibited the leasing of the condominium units to "others as
regular practice for business, speculative investment or other singular pur-
poses....' The amendment also contained a provision which allowed the
board to permit limited leasing in order to avoid hardships when, for example,
20. Id. at 635.
21. No. 53418 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1977).
22. 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1976).
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an owner was transferred in employment, requiring such owner to move
prior to selling his unit.
Again, the issue was whether the amendment was valid and whether the
plaintiff would be subject to it. The court upheld the restrictions, holding that
they were neither unlimited nor unreasonable and should be enforced. The
court specifically found reasonable the protection of the lifestyle of unit
occupants owning residences for other than business purposes. The court
reiterated the position that the uniqueness of problems created by con-
dominium living and the resulting necessity for greater control over the
limitation on the rights of individual owners have been recognized.23
2. Sales.
a. Hoover and Morris Development Co. v. Mayfield. 24 A condo-
minium association, controlled by a developer, filed suit to evict the prospec-
tive purchaser of a unit and to enjoin the present owner of a unit from selling
the condominium unit. The complaint arose because the declaration required
any condominium unit owner seeking to sell, rent or lease a condominium
unit to give notice to the condominium association's board of directors. The
condominium declaration required that such notice contain a true copy of a
bona fide offer bearing the signature of all parties and the terms of the sale or
lease. The condominium declaration further provided that if an owner
attempted to sell or lease his unit without affording the other owners, the
board of directors or the association the right of first refusal, any sale or lease
would be null and void.
When the present unit owner decided to sell the unit to a tenant who had
been occupying the premises, the owner furnished the board of directors a
certain notice which informed the board of the name of the purchaser, the
price of the sale, the date of the closing of the sale, and the employment of the
husband and wife who were to purchase the unit.
The question presented was whether the notice of intent to sell the unit con-
formed with the condominium declaration's requirement that a bona fide
offer bearing the signature of all parties be presented to the association so
that it and the owners could decide whether to exercise their right of first
refusal. The court found that the notice of intent did not meet the require-
ments contained in the declaration, which did not require a notice of intent
but instead required the unit owner to furnish a true copy of a bona fide offer
from the prospective purchaser or tenant. The notice of intent was merely a
23. Id. at 486.
24. 233 G. 593, 212 S.E.2d 778 (1975).
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letter signed for the seller by his agent and was not a bona fide offer. The only
offer term contained in the notice was the purchase price. Most importantly,
the court held that a condominium owner must "comply strictly" with the
condominium declaration. Based on the specific facts of this case, however,
the court found that there was a waiver of the right of first refusal.
D. The Problem: Maintenance Responsibilities
1. Old Virginia Ass'n v. Rivers.25 This case involved a suit by an associa-
tion against an owner who refused to pay his condominium monthly
assessments. The defendant unit owner took the position that he was not
obligated to pay assessments because he believed the association had not per-
formed services required under the condominium declaration, and when the
association had performed, had done so negligently, permitting water to
damage his unit.
The issue was whether a unit owner was relieved of his obligation to pay
assessments because of his belief that the association had not performed its
duties. In a precise and correct holding the court found that:
Payment of the association assessments is for the mutual benefit
and protection of all members of the association and may not be legal-
ly withheld by an owner because of the association's failure to per-
form sevices. The obligation to pay assessments is created by an
affirmative covenant running with the land. The defendant had no
legal right to withhold assessments because of alleged acts of the
association including alleged water damage caused by the
association's misconduct. Disputes with the association of the type
raised by the defendant, if recourse is had to the court, may be proper-
ly raised only by bringing an action as Plaintiff or a counter-claim as
counter-claim Plaintiff. 26
2. Country Club Estates Ass'n v. Gronick.2 ' A condominium association
sued certain unit owners who had refused to allow contractors to install
aluminum trim on the outside of their units. The decision to install this
aluminum trim had been made by the board of directors. Under the govern-
ing documents of the condominium, this decision was one that could be made
solely by the board. No special assessment was necessary for the improve-
ment. The defendant owner contended that the aluminum trim was not an act
25. No. 604038 (Ga. St. Ct. of Fulton County 1977).
26. Id.
27. No. 77-8523 CZ (Mich. 1978).
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of repair, maintenance or replacement authorized by the association.
The issue was whether the owners could successfully prevent the associa-
tion from performing a maintenance responsibility. The court, once again,
noted that ownership of a condominium unit is subject to conditions imposed
by the condominium statute, the declaration and the authorized rules and
regulations of the association. In this case, one of the conditions was that the
common elements were subject to a permanent easement in favor of the con-
dominium association for the maintenance and the repair of such elements.
This permanent easement included an easement to maintain and repair "the
exterior of the structure and all external improvements." There was no
challenge to the position that the exterior of a unit was part of the common
area subject to this easement. The court held that:
The installation of aluminum trim over the wooden fluting dentil
work on the outside of the Defendant's unit is an act of maintenance
within the province of an association. Absent the need for a vote of all
co-owners (where funds are available without assessment of the
members) the Association Board is necessarily given discretion in
determining the most efficient and practical way to maintain the
external portion of the buildings. This discretion is granted by the
association through the applicable state statute and by the co-owners
of the apartments. The term maintenance should be construed liberally
in favor of the condominium association. The utilization of aluminum
trim in lieu of yearly painting or other required work is a reasonable
method of upkeep, for which the association is responsible."2
The defendant also argued that to permit the installation of the trim would
deprive each owner of control over the exterior of his unit. Again, the court
held against the defendant and found that this lack of control is well known
in modern condominium living and must be endured by all who buy into the
development. The defendant was enjoined from further rejecting or interfer-
ing with the contractor's work of installing the aluminum trim on the exterior
of the units.
E. The Problem: Pets.
1. Northcrest Home Owners Ass'n v. Friedman.2 9 One unit owner's dog
bit another unit owner. After this incident, the board of directors held a
special meeting to consider the incident, resolved that the owner of the dog
28. Id
29, No. N966677 (Ga. Super. Ct. of Fulton County 1977).
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would have to remove the dog from the condominium property. The decision
was made that the association's counsel should seek a temporary restraining
order against the owner and, subsequently, a mandatory injunction pro-
hibiting the unit owner who owned the dog and the guest occupying his unit
from bringing or keeping the dog on the common elements of the con-
dominium or in the individual unit. The board was acting in accordance with
the authority of the condominium declaration which stated that the board
could determine that a pet "endangers the health or unreasonably disturbs
the owner of any townhouse" and, if so found, could forbid the animal from
being on the property.
The issue was whether a dog who had created a safety problem on the con-
dominium property could be prevented from coming on the property in
accordance with the declaration's provisions.
The court granted the temporary restraining order and, in a consent judg-
ment, the mandatory injunction prohibited the owner from bringing his dog
on the common elements or keeping his dog in his unit. Specifically, the
injunction held that the defendant was enjoined from "bringing or allowing
to be kept in or on any private residence... or in or on any part of the
common area... !' the unit owner's dog.
III. ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES
Most of the examples above demonstrate that the courts can resolve a
dispute in a community association. The examples also illustrate, however,
that a resolution in the courts causes all parties substantial time and money.
The time duration for resolving the dispute in court, generally, injures the
best interests of the entire community. During the court proceeding the prob-
lem festers among the same people and neighbors whose cooperation is
necessary for the community association to operate efficiently. The expense
of the proceeding usually is an unforeseen item adversely affecting the
association because its income is almost always entirely generated from
assessments levied against the members. In many situations additional
assessments levied on the membership to support judicial enforcement of a
covenant or rule against a member leads to further problems in collecting the
assessment from a minority of homeowners who fail to appreciate the impor-
tance of such enforcement.
While some disputes inevitably wind up in court, there are several
possibilities short of litigation which might lend themselves to resolution of
various community association disputes. The alternatives will not always lead
to extra judicial dispute resolution and, obviously, should not be viewed as a
replacement for the judicial system. In many instances, however, the sugges-
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tions may prevent a dispute from arising, or decrease the time and money
necessary to resolve a community association dispute. Moreover, these sug-
gestions would likely decrease the work load of the judiciary and lead to a
better and more congenial living environment for those in the community
association. Some of the alternatives, technically, are not alternative enforce-
ment mechanisms. They are, instead, a means of dispute avoidance. They are
preventive in nature and would assist the community association prior to the
occurrence of an actual dispute. Other alternatives are curative, that is, of
assistance after a dispute has surfaced.
A. Preventive Alternatives
I. Legal Documents. A good set of community association legal
documents, that is, a declaration, the by-laws and, in some cases, articles of
incorporation, will often enable the association and its membership to avoid
a controversy. Many association disputes would never arise if the draftsman
of the association documents created legal documents which contemplate and
fit the concept of the community in its development state and as an ongoing
enterprise. Boiler plate documents can be disastrous. A well drafted set of
community association documents is flexible, unique to the community and
realistic. "
(a) Architectural Change Provisions. Some good examples where,
perhaps, controversies could have been avoided by well-thought-out
documents can be seen in some of the above cases concerning architectural
violations.
The Raleigh Square case clearly demonstrates two points cncerning docu-
ment drafting. First, it is always wise to have clear headings on sections of an
association document. Had this been the case in Raleigh Square, the associa-
tion could have shown the defendant that the section she relied on to suggest
the board did have authority to allow her to change actually gave the board
authority to act only in a different situation. Distinct section headings, while
seemingly an insignificant item, do assist associations and their members in
understanding the purposes of certain covenants.
Second, Raleigh Square highlights a particular provision in community
association legal documents which needs to be drafted clearly. This provision
concerns the board of directors' right to allow changes in the common area.
Much time and expense was necessary to review the condominium's docu-
ments and, subsequently, debate an issue which might have been avoided had
30. Hyatt, Community Associations: How to Draft Documents That Work, 7 REAL
EST L, J. 26(1978).
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the documents clearly specified the board's right to approve or to disapprove
individual homeowner changes in the common area. Without its rights
having been clearly spelled out, the board of directors in Raleigh Square was,
as a fiduciary over the interests of the association members, quite concerned
with allowing an individual homeowner to violate the covenants. Once the
homeowner refused to remove the architectural violation, the case had to
proceed to court, regardless of whether the board would have had objection
to the change. 3'
The Grimes case also illustrates how a dispute might have been avoided
had the association documents contained necessary and clearly drafted provi-
sions. Had the original association documents designated certain items as
limited common areas and/or anticipated problems of the nature illustrated
in the case, the issue might have been resolved without need of litigation.
Artful drafting of the documents could have created limited common ele-
ment fencing around patios and could have provided that air conditioning
compressors, if placed on the common areas, would be the responsibility of
the individual owners.
(b) Rule Adoption and Modification Provisions. Another area of concern
in drafting community association documents should be rule adoption and
modification provisions. As indicated in the Holleman case, if a set of
association legal documents is drafted properly to include the right of the
board of directors to adopt rules, courts will enforce these rules, provided
they are reasonable. While none of the above cases addressed the specific
problem of a community association's power to repeal a rule, repeatedly
community association documents appear which contain a provision allow-
ing the board of directors to adopt rules and regulations, but requiring a
majority of association membership to repeal them. What might appear on
its face to be democratic is, in reality, completely unworkable. Since the
31. An example of a provision that should be incorporated in a community association
declaration and which would assist in the issue of architectural violations present in the Raleigh
Square case would be the following:
No owner, occupant, lessee or lessor, or any other person may make an exterior change,
alteration or construction, nor erect, place or post any sign, object light, or thing on the ex-
terior of the buildings or on any common element without first obtaining the written ap-
proval of the Board or its delegate. Application shall be in writing and shall provide such
information as the Board may reasonably require. The Board or its delegate shall publish
written architectural standards for exterior alterations or additions and any request in
substantial compliance therewith shall be approved. In the event that the Board or its
delegate fails to approve or disapprove such application within sixty (60) days after it shall
have been submitted, its approval will not be required and compliance with this section will
be recognized.
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association is an on-going enterprise requiring the flexibility to adopt to
changed circumstances, and, since the board of directors needs the business
discretion enabling it to react to changed circumstances, the association
documents should give the board the right to adopt, modify and repeal rules
and regulations. Obviously, in the event a majority of the membership
disagrees with certain rules, provisions concerning the membership's right to
remove directors are present.
(c) Right of First Refusal Provisions. Some of the cases discussed above
concerned the right of first refusal. A community association's right of first
refusal requires a member homeowner to give notice to the association of an
impending sale and authorizes the association to buy the house or to
substitute a buyer for the one proposed by the owner.
Before placing this provision in the association documents, a draftsman
should always ask himself why. Many draftsmen almost automatically have
placed the right of first refusal in community association documents. In
reality, the community association is hard pressed to use the provision, if only
for the reason of the expense involved. Additionally, in many cases, the
association completely disregards the administrative process of accumulating
information and passes on every sale. The right can become, however, a
substantial liability in the event claims of discrimination arise.
In one case involving the right of first refusal which never resulted in litiga-
tion and which is not outlined above, a seller filed a federal housing
discrimination complaint alleging an association rejected the buyer on the
basis of race. After incurring legal defense expenses, the association
demonstrated that it never rejected the buyer. Instead, the association took a
position of "no action", since proper information had not been received.
The association never knew the race of the buyer and was uncertain whether
an actual buyer ever existed.
The case shows that when a right of first refusal is present, the door is open
for unfounded discrimination claims, which can result in unnecessary
dispute. Once a discrimination claim is pending, past use of the right comes
into question to resolve the issue whether the right has been continuously
used as a means to discriminate. Records frequently do not exist, however,
because the right has been perceived by the association as administratively
burdensome and impractical. There is, therefore, no "track record" to
demonstrate how past cases have been handled by the association or to verify
that a case in question was not handled differently, because of a discrim-
inatory purpose, from past situations. The case also shows that the right was
only used to gather information for the association records. This alone
accounts for the association's refusal to act until it received the name of the
prospective buyer. The buyer's name was at least important for meeting
notice and assessment billing purposes.
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Since the right of first refusal often creates the potential for disputes
resulting in liability, draftsmen should consider whether the right is desirable.
Associations also should consider whether to remove the right from their
documents. Replacing the right of first refusal with a sale-and-lease-notice
and information-gathering provisions, without an association right to
approve or reject buyers, serves the purpose for which many associations
now employ the right of first refusal, namely, record keeping. Such a pro-
vision, as indicated in the Glenvale case, should be enforceable.
2. The Statute. A further problem, illustrated by Grimes, is the existence
of statutory provisons unduly restraining amicable dispute resolution in a
community association. Two examples are readily apparent. The first per-
tains to the creation of limited common elements. The second pertains to the
establishment of a condominium owner's percentage interest in the common
area and the owner's proportionate payment of the common expense.
Many condominium statutes expressly require that the original declaration
set forth what is to be limited common element. This designation would then
be permanent. In the last few years, several jurisdictions have adopted con-
dominium statutes which allow more flexibility in this area. For example,
Georgia,32 Virginia, 3  and the District of Columbia3 ' have enacted statutes
allowing assignment or reassignment of limited common elements. These
provisions could assist the association membership by allowing it to deter-
mine what parts of the common area are best limited in use to only a few
homeowners. Specifically, a statutory provision of this sort might have
avoided the dispute raised in Grimes.
The condominium statutes which allow assignment or reassignment of
limited common elements contain several statutory requirements which must
be met either in the declaration or under the statute. For this reason, it is
extremely important that a draftsman heed the provisions of these sections if
potential benefits are to be available to a community association at a
later time.
Several condominium statutes allow a disproportionate assessment of
common expenses as well as independent establishment of a units percentage
interest in the common area from its assessment contribution." Prior to the
enactment of such provisions, all common expenses had to be allocated,
without deviation, uniformly among all unit owners on the basis of a unit's
32. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1619e (1978).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.57 (Supp. 1979).
34. D.C. CODE ANN. CODE § 5-1223 (1977 & Supp. 1979).
35. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 5-1221 (Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-16E (1978); VA. CODE
§ 55-4.2 (1977)
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percentage interest in the common area. In turn, the interest in the common
area was, by statute, required to be based on square footage of a unit, unit
value or, alternatively, an equal pro rata distribution of the assessment
among all units. One obvious problem with this provision is that if
assessments are based on square footage of units, a "we" versus "they"
mentality inevitably develops between the larger and smaller unit owners.
Alternatively, if assessments are allocated equally among all units, a dispute
looms over the community concerning the issue of some owners' receiving a
greater benefit for a contribution to the common expense equal to that given
by other owners.
A prime example of the latter potential conflict occurred in a condo-
minium community where a draftsman gave each of fifty condominium units
an equal two percent undivided interest in the common area. The applicable
condominium statute required each homeowner to pay an equal assessment.
Homeowners of smaller-sized units complained that their utility bill
payments were disproportionately high because they were contributing an
amount equal to that contributed by larger-unit owners. The homeowners
decided amendments to the condominium declaration were needed to resolve
this and several other community issues.
The jurisdiction in which the condominium was located had adopted a new
condominium statute which contained a provision allowing disproportionate
assessment of common expenses. In unanimously approved amendments to
the condominium declaration, a provision allowing for assessment for utility
service based on square footage was passed. Otherwise, other contributions
for services, except blanket insurance coverage, were kept equal. Because the
statute in effect at the time of the adoption of the amendment allowed dis-
proportionate assessment of the common expense, and no longer required
percentage interest in the common area to determine the assessment to be
paid, the change was accomplished without changing percentage interests in
the common area, a move which would have had lenders obviously con-
cerned about their mortgage securities. Most importantly, however, a dispute
concerning what was viewed as inequitable allocations of common expenses
was avoided.
In a more general sense, a clearly written and comprehensive condomin-
ium statute supporting a condominium association would assist in preventing
dispute. Not until 1974, when the State of Virginia adopted "a second
generation" condominium statute, did such a condominium statute exist in
any state. Several states have since followed Virginia's example and, most
recently, the American Bar Association Committee on Uniform Laws
approved the Uniform Condominium Act which incorporates many favor-
able provisions of the second-generation type associations. It is a compliment
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to the organized bar that the Uniform Condominium Act contains, for
example, provisions allowing for the assignment and reassignment of limited
common elements,3" the independent establishment of the assessment contri-
bution and percentage interest in the common area, and the disproportionate
levying of assessments. 31
(3) The Legal Audit. The board of directors may well prevent internal
disputes within a community association by seeking a legal audit. A legal
audit is a review of the legal situation at the community association. Much
like a financial audit, the legal audit reviews the composite legal picture of a
community association. The documents, rules and regulations, board resolu-
tions, insurance, budget, contracts and various other items may be reviewed
to determine whether the community is likely to confront certain impending
problems.
There are several examples of situations where imminent problems may
be averted by a legal audit. The inadequacy of condominium insurance might
go unrealized unless someone conversant with insurance reviews an associa-
tion's insurance policy. Insurance discovered to be inadequate after a cas-
ualty loss most certainly will result in a community dispute.
A review of the association documents to determine what architectural
changes a board of directors could allow might also prevent situations such as
that in Grimes. Such a review might reveal needed amendments such as those
required in Raleigh Square or Nugent. Additionally, a review could reveal the
extent of the association's regulatory jurisdiction, an issue brought to the
court's attention in Holleman. Obviously, a legal audit also should determine
whether the association covenants have been adhered to, thus preventing
potential future actions against a board of directors for claims such as the
breach of the board's fiduciary duty to homeowners or the use of a first
refusal right in a haphazard fashion, indicating discrimination.
(4) Miscellaneous. There are several miscellaneous mechanisms by which
an association might prevent internal disputes. Newsletters, open board
meetings and clearly drafted rules are but three of these mechanisms.
A newsletter is an excellent means of keeping all homeowners informed.
Informed homeowners are, in turn, more apt to understand how and why
association policy has been formed, thus lessening discontent. A newsletter
also can assist in dispute resolution by publication of a factual accounting of
the events surrounding the dispute.
Open board of directors' meetings open the workings of the association to
36. UNIFORM CONDOMINIUM AcT § 2-109.
37. Id. § 2-108.
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the sunshine.3" Even though it might be highly unlikely that any impropriety
is to be undertaken in a closed meeting, the appearance of impropriety leads
to homeowner discontent. Closed board meetings can only result in the
appearance of impropriety.
A third mechanism to prevent community association disputes is the board
of directors' drafting clear rules and regulations when exercising the associa-
tion's rule-making power. This point can best be illustrated by a condo-
minium association which passed a rule regulating erection of screen doors.
The rule stated that aluminum-framed storm windows with aluminum finish
could be placed on the units. Without board approval, a homeowner placed a
white aluminum screen door on his home. The board wished to challenge this
action since it was believed the white aluminum screen doors violated the
association rule. Upon reflection, the board realized that its rule did not
clearly specify that the aluminum screen doors in the community needed
to be the natural silver-like unfinished aluminum. An unnecessary dispute
was created.
B. Curative Mechanisms
Obviously, attempts at preventing disputes in a community association
might not always be successful. In that event, the recourse generally is to go
to court. Experience has shown, however, that there are many community
association disputes which can be resolved in a less expensive, quicker yet
equally equitable fashion. Some of these mechanisms are internal to the
association; some are external, that is, involving a third party.
1. Internal Mechanisms
a. The refining power. One means of resolving a community association
dispute is to empower the association with the right to fine its members for
violations of covenants, rules and regulations. The fine compels adherence to
the standards of the community. Some condominium statutes, Georgia's for
example, allow a condominium association to fine its members for violation
of a provision in the documents or a board rule or regulation. 9 Otherwise, in
the case of a condominium created pursuant to a condominium statute not
granting an association's power to fine, a jurisdiction's statutory or case law
38. "A day with a closed meeting is like a day without "sunshine:' Continuous days without
'sunshine' cause the tree of democracy to wither and die." Accardi v. Mayor of North
Wildwood, 145 N.J. Super. 532, 550, 368 A.2d 416, 426 (1976).
39. GA CODE ANN § 85-1613e (1978).
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would have to be reviewed to determine if fines are permissable. Under all cir-
cumstances, the fining power should be expressly incorporated into the
association documents.
The fining provision is effective in resolving association disputes. For
example, where a dog continuously barks creating a general nuisance
throughout the community, without existence of the fining power, a com-
munity association would need to take this issue to court. Furthermore, cases
concerning recreational vehicles illegally parked on the common area are
examples of situations where the fining power can assist in dispute resolution.
With the fining power, the board can attempt to resolve these issues inter-
nally, and if neighborly communication fail, the fining power can be
employed. Obviously, it is not suggested that the fine be indiscriminately or
arbitrarily used but rather, in the proper case, complimented with a form of a
due process procedure.
The fining power should be tied to an association's lien rights. The pro-
cedure would operate such that once a fine is levied, it is a lienable charge, if
not paid. In a suit on a lien, the association documents or condominium
statute should provide the association the right to collect attorney's fees.
b. Due Process. Prior to the association instituting a fine for covenant or
rule violation or, exercising its adjudicative powers, the association should
adhere to some form of due process. The due process procedure can assist in
dispute resolution by forcing face-to-face confrontations between disputing
parties and by furnishing a forum to air grievances. In many cases what
superficially appears to be an irreconcilable controversy deteriorates into a
mere communication misunderstanding when the parties meet face to face.
Furthermore, attempting dispute resolution by assessing a fine, by imple-
menting such other enforcement mechanisms as suspension of the right to
vote, or suspension of the use of community facilities without affording the
alleged violator an opportunity to present his or her side of the issue, opens a
door for real or imagined abuse. Most importantly, not affording the
violator the opportunity to be heard generally results in litigation to collect
the fine.
Aside from the practical benefits of employing a due process procedure,
increasingly there is reason to believe such a procedure is, either by statute or
judicially, legally required. For example, in Virginia under the Subdivided
Land Sales Act of 1978,0 a community association is compelled to follow a
procedure affording a hearing before a sanction can be imposed for violation
of a covenant or a rule or regulation. This Act is not a condominium statute
40. VA. CODE § 55-344 A(8) (Supp. 1979).
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but instead applies to community associations where a substantial number of
lots are sold under installment contracts. Surely, this hearing at least should
adhere to basic due process principles, such as notice and the opportunity to
be heard. Concluding otherwise would effectively make the requirement of a
hearing meaningless. The Uniform Condominium Act also requires a condo-
minium association to afford a due process procedure before a fine can
be imposed."
While courts have not yet directly considered the issue whether a com-
munity association is required to follow due process procedures in exercising
its adjudicative powers,"2 it can be concluded that the judiciary in some
jurisdictions, if confronted with the issue, would require adherence to due
process dictates. This conclusion can be reached in light of the judicial view
that community association rules are more similar to municipal by-laws than
to private deed restrictions."3 The community association's imposition of a
penalty for violation of a rule or covenant therefore is functionally equivalent
to the imposition of a penalty by a municipality's judiciary for violation of an
ordinance." Hence, in exercising the fight of enforcement through its adjudi-
cative powers under its declaration and the state statute, the community
association should be given the responsibility for observing due process' 5
guarantees.
For these practical and legal reasons, the association should adopt a stan-
41. Uniform Condominium Act § 3-102(a)(l 1). In the Comment to this section, the drafts-
men state that the power to fine is given to the association to provide the association "with
sufficient powers to exercise its 'governmental' functions as the ruling body of the con-
dominium community.' Id. at Comment 5.
42. But see Holmes v. Brown, 146 Ga. 402, 91 S.E. 408 (1917), where a member of an
unincorporated association (a union) would have been wrongfully suspended if internal trial
occurred without notice, in his absence and without a written charge made against him. It
should be noted, however, that the association's by-laws required that these protections be
followed.
43. Johnson v. Keith, 368 Mass. 316, 331 N.E.2d 879 (1975).
44. See Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 438 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. II1. 1977),
rev'd on itsfacts, 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978) where it was found that a company town was the
"functional equivalent of a municipality" and that the company town, although private pro-
perty, had taken on such public aspect that plaintiff council could not be barred access without
violating its rights under the United States Constitution. The court looked to aspects such as the
town's power to enforce a disciplinary code and the town providing services such as fire protec-
tion, sewage and garbage disposal, water, outside lighting, snow removal, recreational
facilities, and other similar "governmental" services to determine that the defendant private
town was the functional equivalent of a municipality.
45. See Hyatt & Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and Administration of
Condominium and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915,924-25 (1976).
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dard of conduct for itself before internally enforcing a covenant or rule. For
example, after receiving a complaint concerning certain actions of the unit
owner, the association should notify the violator of the complaint and give
him an opportunity to cure the situation. If the situation persists, the associa-
tion should request the violator to appear at a hearing to be held by, perhaps,
a covenants committee which consists of other members of the association
and, quite possibly, members of the board of directors. The opportunity to
present his side of the issue should be given to the alleged violator at the hear-
ing. At the same time, the complaining party or parties should be able to pre-
sent their views. On the basis of what has been presented to the committee, a
sanction could be imposed. This is where the fining power can work quite
successfully.
Once determined that a violation has occurred and a sanction is imposed,
the violator should have the additional opportunity to appeal this decision to
the entire board if the covenants committee did not include board members.
If the covenants committee included board members, the appeal board
should exclude those board members who sat as the covenants committee. 6
46. A provision which could assist the implementation of this due process procedure and
could be incorporated into community association declarations is as follows:
Section 1.
Procedure. The Board shall not impose a fine, suspend voting, or infringe upon any
other rights of the member or other occupant for violation of rules or the provisions of the
declaration unless and until the following procedure is followed:
(a) Demand. Written demand to cease and desist from an alleged violation shall be
served upon the alleged violator specifying:
(i) The alleged violation; (ii) the action required to abate the violation; and (ii) the action
required to abate the violation; and (iii) the time during which the violation may be abated
without further sanction, if such violation is a continuing one or a statement that any
further violation of the same rule may result in the imposition of sanction after notice of
hearing if the violation is not continuing.
(b) Notice. Within twelve months of such demand, if the violation continues past the
period allowed in the demand for abatement without penalty, or if the same rule is subse-
quently violated, the board shall serve the violator with written notice of a hearing to be
held by the board or committee to be established by the board in session. The notice
shall contain:
(i) The nature of the alleged violations; (ii) the time and place of the hearing, which time
shall be not less than ten days from the giving of the notice; (iii) an invitation to attend the
hearing and produce any statement, evidence and witnesses on her or his behalf; and (iv)
the proposed sanction to be imposed.
(c) Hearing. The hearing shall be held in executive session by the board pursuant to this
notice affording the member a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Prior to the effective-
ness of any sanction hereunder, proof of notice and the invitation to be heard shall be
placed in the minutes of the meeting. Such proof shall be deemed adequate if a copy of the
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c. Internal Administrative Process of the Community Association. Several
issues exist regarding the relationship between the community association's
administrative process and the judicial process in dispute resolution. Two of
these issues, the timing of judicial intervention and the scope of judicial
review, are significant since answers to these issues will reveal when and how
much judicial review will be exercised by a court over an association's internal
attempt to resolve a dispute. While neither issue has been resolved conclusively
by the courts, there is some case law which indicates a judicial reaction to
them.
An analogy between a community association and an administrative
agency could assist courts in this endeavor. At the same time, solving these
issues by use of such an analogy would stimulate the association's internal
dispute resolution. The timing and scope of judicial review could then be
found in a recognized, available body of case law giving deference to the
association's internal dispute resolution mechanisms. There are several
reasons why an analogy between a community association and an admin-
istrative agency can be justified.
First, an administrative agency in nature is analogous to that of a com-
munity association. An administrative agency is a governmental authority
created under local, state or federal law. 7 The community association,
created by and enforced through state law and action, together with its police
power authority to affect property rights, make the association analogous to
a government. Indeed, several courts have referred to the community
association as a mini-government.s
Second, the functions of an administrative agency and a community
association are somewhat analogous. As in the case of an administrative
notice together with a statement of the date and manner of delivery is entered by the officer
or the director who delivered such notice. The notice requirement shall be deemed satisfied
if a violator appears at the meeting. The minutes of the meeting shall contain a written
statement of the results of the hearing and the sanction, if any imposed.
(d) Appeal. Within fifteen days following the hearing held pursuant to this section, the
alleged violator may appeal the decision of the committee to the board sitting en banc if the
committee does not include any board members. If the committee established pursuant to
this section contains board members the appeal shall be to the board of directors,
excluding those members who sat on the committee at the hearing held pursuant to this
section. On appeal, the sanction imposed may be reversed, modified, or upheld at the
discretion of those hearing the appeal.
47. An administrative agency is "a governmental authority, other than a court and other
than a legislative body, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule making:' 1 K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIES § 1:2 (2d ed. 1978).
48. Johnson v. Keith, 368 Mass. 316, 331 N.E.2d 879 (1975); Holleman v. Mission Trace
Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
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agency, the community association's primary function is to advance the will
and well-being of the people. The association is created to perform activities
necessary to advance the health, safety and welfare of its membership or the
people over which it has control. 49
Third, the community association's powers resemble those of an adminis-
trative agency. Much like an agency, the association has rule-making powers.
The association also adjudicates disputes, provides for enforcement of its
judgments by assessing fines, and suspends the rights to vote and use associa-
tion facilities.50
Since community associations and administrative agencies are similar, the
principles of judicial review of agency actions might aptly be applied to
association actions. Of course, there are many dissimilarities between
associations and agencies, suggesting that judicial review principles should
not be blindly applied. For example, the clearest distinction is that the
association is a privately owned enterprise."
49. See Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211,
222, 334 A.2d 514, 522, (1975), wherein the court stated:
The primary function of administrative agencies is to advance the will and weal of the
people as ordained by their representatives- the Legislature. These agencies are created in
order to perform activities which the Legislature deems desirable and necessary to forward
the health, safety, welfare and morals of the citizens of this State. While these agencies at
times perform some activities which are legislative in nature and thus have been dubbed as
quasi-legislative duties, they in addition take on a judicial coloring in that frequently,
within the exercise of their power, they are called upon to make factual determinations and
thus adjudicate, and it is in that sense that they are also recurrently considered to be acting
in a quasi-judicial capacity. This dual role which administrative agencies play has long
been accepted in this State as being constitutionally permissable .... However, this
authority is not the same and, therefore, is distinguishable from the exercising of the
'judicial powers' of this State.
See URBAN LAND INSTITUTE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE, MANAGING A Suc.
CESSFUL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION 3 (1974) (an important aspect of the community association
lies in its basic nature as a privately owned and operated vehicle of service to a specific
community).
50. It is this point which creates in community association law an issue similar to a long-
standing issue existing in administrative law; that is, whether a community association, in
acting as a mini-government, is performing a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial function. Since
a community association has the power to legislate and to adjudicate it is, actually, acting in
both capacities. This dual capacity, similar to the dual capacity of an administrative agency,
would indicate that a community association is exercising a power similar to what some courts
have described as an administrative agency's "administrative power!' See Bentley v. Chastain,
242 Ga. 348, 249 S.E.2d 38 (1978); Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand &
Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 334 A.2d 514 (1975).
51. The importance of this should be noted since some community association disputes
probably can be resolved only by litigation. An example of this is association assessment collec-
tion and lien foreclosure.
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1. Timing of Review. Frequently, before resorting to a meaningful
internal problem a community association will seek immediate judicial
redress of grievances against its members. Conversely, association members
often seek judicial dispute resolution before any significant internal attempts
are made at resolving the dispute. In the administrative law area, internal
administrative remedies, whether created by the legislature, the agency, or
imposed by due process principles, must be exhausted before a dispute is
justiciable in the courts. Since a community association is required either by
statute or by judicial decisions to adhere to at least minimal due process pro-
tections, an internal mechanism for dispute resolution should exist. At least
in those cases where a form of due process procedure is statutorily required,
courts should require exhaustion of the legislatively outlined internal enforce-
ment process as a precondition to hearing the case. Because of the separation
of powers doctrine, this judicial restraint appears appropriate in light of the
policy and letter of legislation giving the association discretion to establish a
dispute-resolution mechanism consistent with due process. Otherwise, in the
absence of a statute requiring a due process procedure, it would be somewhat
inconsistent if the judicial conclusion requiring at least minimal protections
of due process, such as prior notice and a hearing, did not also indicate that
this procedure must be used prior to judicial involvement in the dispute.5 2
2. Scope of Review. Administrative law textwriters urge courts
reviewing administrative decisions to focus upon the extent of discretion
delegated to that agency and whether the agency acted within the limits of its
discretion." The key is controlling discretion through administratively
established standards and safeguards.-" Therefore, the only review author-
52. Some older case law indicates, at least in an unincorporated association, that redress for
an internal dispute must first be handled within the organization. In Holmes v. Brown, 146 Ga.
402, 405, 91 S.E. 408, 409 (1917) the court specifically held:
A member of a voluntary association (a union) should avail himself of his remedies
within the organization.. .as against any attempt to exclude him from the organization.
When these remedies are exhausted, a member who has been disfranchised, suspended, or
expelled in violation of the constitution and by-laws may appeal to a court of equity for the
protection of his property rights incident to membership.
See Bowden v. Kennedy, 186 Ga. 174, 178-79, 197 S.E. 325, 327 (1938) (if plaintiff-members
of an unincorporated political association having no constitution or by-laws have any rights
which have been violated, they must first seek redress within the organization). It should be
noted that community associations are mandatory membership associations.
53, 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 91 (1965); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE § 3:15 (2d ed. 1978).
54. In the most recent edition of this treatise, Kenneth Culp Davis urges that the standards
and safeguards should be administratively established so that the agency operates under its own
rule of law. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 3:14 (2d ed. 1978). Standards such
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ized in review of administrative agency decisions is that inherent in the power
of the judiciary. Hence, the limited questions for review are whether the
agency acted beyond the discretionary powers conferred upon it, abused its
discretion, or acted arbitrarily or capriciously with regard to an individual's
constitutional rights."
These questions and this perception of the limited scope of review of an
administrative agency's decisions are, without notable comment, being
employed by courts in review of a community association's actions or deci-
sions.16 While many court cases are in the area of architectural changes,
there is no reason not to extend the logic of these cases into other issues con-
fronting the community association.
(1) The Power of the Association. If administrative law principles pertain-
ing to judicial review were used to determine the scope of judicial review of a
community association decision, the first question for the court would be
whether the association has acted beyond the powers conferred upon it. 7
Country Club and Northcrest Homeowners are judicial examinations of the
authority of an association's board of directors. In Gronick and Friedman, it
was found that the association had acted within its discretionary powers con-
cerning maintenance and pet regulation, respectively. The case of Mavrakis
v. Plaza Del Sol. Ass'n" is another illustration of a reviewing court raising
this question, but in Mavrakis the association was found to have acted
beyond its powers.
In Mavrakis, the condominium declaration, by-laws and articles of incor-
poration permitted condominium units to be used by, among others, the
owner's family and guest in the owner's absence. The condominium associa-
tion's board of directors attempted, by adoption of a rule, to limit a unit's
occupancy to only an owner's "immediate family." Additionally, limitations
were placed on the duration of an owner's family occupancy. The plaintiff-
owner filed suit alleging that the rule exceeded the board's powers. The board
countered by alleging that it had the discretionary power to promote the unit
owner's health, happiness, and peace of mind and that the use of common
as those adopted in Nugent v. Lake Village Homeowners Ass'n are, therefore, to be encour-
aged.
55. See Bentley v. Chastain, 242 Ga. 348, 249 S.E.2d 38 (1978).
56. Numerous courts have determined that the standard for review in cases concerning archi-
tectural covenants is whether the controlling entity acted arbitrarily, capriciously or
unreasonably in denying or approving a change. This determination is based on covenants law.
57. In a condominium, the source of these powers is the condominium declaration, by-laws
and statute. In an HOA, the source of these powers generally is only the declaration
and by-laws.
58. No. 77-6049 (Fla. 1978).
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property was subject to the association's rules and regulations. The court
held that while the regulation itself was not unreasonable, the method of its
adoption was improper. Hence, the rule was unenforceable. Although the
restriction could have been imposed by an amendment to the declaration, the
restriction imposed by rule was beyond the board's powers in light of the
declaration's provision."'
(2) Abuse of Discretion. If the principles of administrative law were used
by analogy to determine the scope of review of a community association's
decision, a reviewing court's second question would be whether the associa-
tion abused its discretion. Typically, this question arises in two different
situations. The first would involve an association's action on an existing pro-
vision; the second would involve an association's action to adopt a rule
or policy.
(i) Action on an existing provision. Two types of cases illustrate an associa-
tion's action on an existing provision. The first concerns a situation similar to
Raleigh Square but with the added element that an association does not act
timely. Plaza Del Prado Condominium Ass'n v. Richman6" is such a case.
In Richman, like Raleigh Square, the community association sought to
have an individual unit owner comply with certain architectural control pro-
visions. The provision in Richman, however, concerned removal of a porch
railing and not a sidewalk. An important distinction between Richman and
Raleigh Square is that in Richman one year had elapsed between the time of
the installation of the violation and the time objections were raised and, as
stated by the court, the board was under a duty to assert itself sooner. The
court found that the association, by not doing so, was estopped from object-
ing to the violation because it had not acted more quickly. While the associa-
tion had the authority to object to an unauthorized improvement on the
common area, to raise no objections to the violation for a one-year period
and then to attempt to require removal was viewed, basically, as an abuse of
59. See Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316, (Ct. App. 1974). On the
basis of a by-law provision which gave the board of directors of homeowners association all
powers, duties, and authority vested in or delegated to the association, and not reserved to the
membership, the court found that a board decision to build a second tennis court on the
common property was valid. The court stated:
The good faith acts of directors of profit or non-profit corporations which are within
the powers of the corporation and within the exercise of an honest business judgment are
valid. Courts will not, at the instance of stockholders or otherwise, interfere with or
regulate the conduct of the directors in the reasonable and honest exercise of their judg-
ment and duties.
34 Colo. App. at 337, 526 P.2d at 317.
60. 345 So. 2d 851 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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the association's discretion.
The second type of situation is represented by cases like Pinewood Greens
Homeowners Ass'n v. Murtha,' I Vinik v. Taylor 2 and Sypol v. Mannes.6 In
each of these cases, the reviewing court found that an abuse of discretion had
not occurred because there had been adherence to either a standard estab-
lished by the association documents or the judicially established standard of
objective reasonableness. In administrative law, a focus for review of an
agency's decision is to determine whether the agency's discretion has been
exercised through established standards and whether there has been an abuse
of agency discretion in that these standards were not followed.
In Pinewood Greens, the declaration provided that proposed additional
homeowner fencing would be scrutinized according to the workmanship,
design, color, material and harmony of the fence to the project as a whole. A
homeowner, without board approval, installed fencing which did not con-
form to the style or design of existing fencing. The judge found that the archi-
tectural committee acted reasonably in declining to approve the fence erected
by the defendants.
The Pinewood Greens case further indicates the limited scope of review
employed by some courts reviewing association decisions, for the judge
found that he would not substitute his opinion of taste for the association's
architectural committee decision, after he determined it acted reasonably. In
essence, the holding echoed a previous decision by a Florida judge in Vinik
(later, again echoed in Saypol) where it was acknowledged that:
Such difficulties as we have had with this appeal have, upon reflec-
tion, been engendered by a peripheral opinion which falls outside the
scope of our appellate judicial function. Quite frankly we are in dis-
agreement with the decision reached by the Board, in approving this
alteration by the Defendants, as we feel, as did the objectors, that the
alteration materially changed the exterior appearance of the building.
If succeeding applicants are loosely granted such approval, it could
lead to a hodge-podge or bizarre outward appearance, with some
balconies enclosed and some not, and different architectural
treatments given sway. It could very well harm or destroy the sym-
metry and attractiveness of the building as a whole. Regardless, this
is not our problem. The unit owners have clearly delegated this
discretion and authority to their elected Board of Directors. If they are
aggrieved, they can make their views known to their Board of Direc-
61. No. 48301 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1976).
62. 270 So. 2d 413 (1972).
63. No. 76-7912 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1977).
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tors and obtain redress, or else, replace the Board according to the
By-laws."4
Broad language that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of an
association's board of directors is clearly analogous to judicial opinions
about administrative agencies. It is axiomatic in administrative law that over-
broad judicial review would have the effect of substituting the judgment of a
judge or jury and should be avoided. When courts acknowledge that they will
not substitute their opinions for a community association's reasonable opin-
ion, at least in those cases concerning approval or rejection of architectural
changes, it appears that an association decision should not be taken lightly.
(ii) Adoption of a Provision. Several cases illustrate the situation where the
association adopts a provision and a reviewing court limits the scope of its
review to a determination of whether the association had abused its discre-
tion .' Typically, these cases involve a question of the reasonableness of the
adopted provision. For example, in Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v.
Norman 6 the court of appeals isolated this issue, indicating that if "a rule is
reasonable the association can adopt it; if not, it cannot."67 This is similar to
the decision of a Missouri court" in a case about whether a condominium
association's board of directors had the right to install locks on doors pro-
viding entry to common passageways of the condominium building. The
association's asserted right derived from a by-law provision granting the
association board the power to adopt reasonable rules. The court
acknowledged that "in reviewing the action of the board in this case, we
believe the standard to be applied is reasonableness." 6 9 Again, as in adminis-
trative law cases, the focus of review was whether the association acted to
64. 270 So. 2d at 417.
65. See Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
and Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). See also Seagate v. Duffy, 330 So.
2d 484 (Fla. 1977).
66. 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
67. Id. at 182.
68. Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
69. Id. at 198. The court also noted:
The Board of Managers of Burtonwood is the designated decision-making body of the
condominium association and exercises broad discretion in the maintenance and opera-
tion of the development. Nesertheless, the Board is not at liberty to promulgate arbitrary
and capricious rules which bear no relationship to the health, happiness and enjoyment of
the unit owners.
Id.
1979]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
adopt its policy in accordance with a standard and, impliedly, whether that
standard was abused.
(iii) Constitutional Rights. The last question for a court to employ in
review of a community association's decision, if the principles of review of an
administrative agency's decision were applied by analogy, is whether the
community association acted arbitrarily or capriously with regard to an indi-
vidual's constitutional rights. This question should be asked where, for
example, association provisions are enforced against a violator without his
actual or constructive notice or where there was enforcement of undistributed
or unpublished rules or architectural covenants without any understandable
standards.
Many courts limited the scope of their review of an association's internal
dispute-resolution to the three basic questions mentioned above; namely, the
three questions encountered in judicial review of administrative agency deci-
sions. While this position has not been judicially formalized by comparing a
community association with an administrative agency, it nevertheless is
intriguing to note the analogous patterns of review in an administrative
agency and a community association. Taking into consideration the initial
analogy and noting the similarity of review afforded agency and association
decisions, one can realistically expect some further judicial clarification of the
scope of review of a community association's dispute-resolution action. Such
judicial clarification may be premised upon precedent from the adminis-
trative law area.70 This could facilitate internal resolution of disputes by fur-
nishing the association a reliable expectation as to when and how much
judicial review of an association decision there will be.
2. External Mechanisms
Aside from the potential for resolving disputes internally, thus precluding
litigation, community associations show how external dispute resolution
mechanisms short of litigation could be employed. Two types of external
mechanisms are apparent.
70. Review of decisions by organizations analogous to an administrative agency is subject to
a similar scope of review. See, e.g. Kirton v. Biggers, 135 Ga. App. 416, 419, 218 S.E.2d 113,
116 (1975), wherein the court stated:
As long as no abuse of... discretion (by the county commissioners) is shown, this court
should not substitute its findings of facts or construction of the evidence for that of the
governmental body.. .Although the county board of commissioners is not an "agency" as
defined (under state law).. .nevertheless, the scope and criteria of judicial review of such
body's decisions is closely analogous to that of an "agency... '
(Vol. 17:295
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol17/iss1/27
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION
a. State Established Mechanisms. Once such mechanism is provided where
a state sets up an arbitration-type process. Such a process has been employed
in Florida for the past two years. Section 718-501 of the Florida Statutes
relating to condominiums establishes an advisory board within the "Division
of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums." 7' This board was established,
among other reasons, for the purpose of providing a means of arbitration of
disputes between individual condominium owners and the community
association. The board consists of owner and developer representatives. Each
existing residential unit contributes one dollar per year to fund the board.
Additionally, upon the first sale of a unit, a ten-dollar assessment is collected
to fund the board. The funds go into a trust fund and are not directly
available for operational expenses. According to some commentators, this
has created severe personnel shortages at the advisory board."2 In a recent
count, the advisory board was shown to have a backlog of one thousand
cases on its calendar because of personnel shortages.
Many of the disputes submitted to the advisory board involve situations
where the association is still controlled by the developer. Often, however,
issues are presented concerning disputes between a unit owner and the
association or management decision.
Because of case backlogs and the still persistent problem of the time it takes
to resolve a complaint, several suggestions have emerged as to how to
improve the Florida arbitration procedure. Senate Bill 30573 and House
Bill 332,"' proposed by two Florida legislatures, would have allowed the
advisory board to employ hearing officers to assist in the arbitration pro-
cedure. The proposed bills would subject hearing officers to the Florida
Administative Procedures Act. Strict control over the taking of testimony
and the finding of law and fact would have been required. Under the bills, the
advisory board would have been empowered to modify any legal conclusions
of the hearing officers. The board's review power over fact findings would
have been more restricted, however. By statute, advisory board decisions
would not have been binding upon the parties; the issue still could have been
presented to a court for its review in a full trial.
Even though the two Florida bills died in committee,7" the arbitration pro-
visions of these two bills were added to House Bill 307 which was approved
71. FLA STAr ANN. § 718.501 (West Supp. 1978).
72. See COMMUNITY Ass'n L. REP 1 (May 1978).
73. FLA S. 305 (1978).
74. FLA H. R. 332 (1978).
75. See COMMUNITY Ass'n L. REP 8 (September 1978).
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by the Florida governor in 1978.76 This bill expands the power of the State
Condominium Advisory Board by giving it the authority to utilize bearing
officers to resolve disputes between the condominium association and indi-
vidual unit owners.
The State of Hawaii similarly introduced Senate Bill 1554-78,1 and House
Bill 3087-78,11 which would amend Section 514-200 of the Hawaiin
"Horizontal Properties Regime Act." The amendment essentially provides
for a grievance committee of the board of directors or a grievance procedure
involving the managing agent through which apartment owners could
regularly seek remedies or solutions to problems beyond the scope of the
powers of the resident manager to immediately solve.79 An appeals
mechanism is established for the aggrieved party to seek review of a decision.
The Hawaiin Condominium Commission would review the decision. The bill
states that it does not create, however, an exclusive remedy or establish a
prerequisite to the pursuit of other available remedies.
From the Florida and Hawaii proposals, it is obvious that some states are
interested in resolving community association disputes without litigation.
While there is no track record for these type mechanisms, aside from the
Florida experience, burdened with inadequate funding, it is at least clear that
dispute resolution in a community association is an issue in which state
legislatures are beginning to show some interest.
It would seem that the use of a legislative arbitration procedure might be
premature since community associations, themselves, have not yet fully
matured. The nation's community associatons are now beginning to take
upon themselves, as opposed to the developer, the administration of the
association.
A prime benefit from these community associations is that the community
is self-regulated through its recorded covenants. While several standards
similar to those applicable to municipalities are most probably applicable to
the community association,8" it is questionible whether a state-legislated
arbitration procedure would be beneficial. Given the opportunity to resolve
disputes internally, many associations have been able to accommodate the
needs of the community.' While there are several examples of the need to
76. Id.
77. HAWAII S. 1554-78 (1978).
78. HAWAII H. R. 3087-78 (1978).
79. See COMMUNITY Ass'n L. REP. 5 (1978).
80. See text accompanying notes 25-28 & 30-31 supra.
81. This observation is based on the personal experience of the author in representing com-
munity associations.
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resort to a court for dispute resolution, there are a myriad of disputes which
have been resolved in community associations without resort to courts.
Establishing a formalized, legislated system of arbitration could seriously
undercut one of the advantages of a community association; that is, being a
private community restricted by private residential covenants. In this vein,
judicially established precedent concerning internal due process and the tim-
ing and scope of judicial review could establish an internal dispute resolution
mechanism comparable to the Florida or Hawaii external mechanisms
without sacrificing the private nature of the community.
b. Privately Established Mechanisms. A second external alternative for
community association dispute resolution might well be use of a procedure
similar to that increasingly being employed by municipalities throughout the
country for dispute resolution of "minor offenses." One such program is the
American Arbitration Association's Community Dispute Service in
Rochester, New York. 2 This service has been provided by the American
Arbitration Association to divert minor disputes away from the courts, and is
typical of several existing informal private mechanisms employing mediation
and arbitration. These mechanisms are inexpensive, fair and prompt.
The prime purpose of this type of service is to mediate and, if unsuccessful,
arbitrate a dispute. Usually, under the existing programs, cases are referred
from the local courts. 3 The mediator, a layman or an attorney, but not a
judge, listens to both sides of a dispute. In many cases under the present
American Arbitration Community Dispute procedure, the mediator talks to
the conflicting parties separately to determine what kind of settlement they
might accept. The goal is to have the parties reach an agreement with which
both sides are comfortable. In the event mediation is unsuccessful, generally
the parties agree to have the mediator act as an arbitrator. The director of the
Rochester program views this program as one especially useful in handling
cases involving a problem between people who already know each other, and
he estimates ninety percent of the Rochester cases involve an ongoing
relationship.'
A private-type mediation or arbitration program seems more amenable
than a state legislated one to use in a community association because of the
possible adverse consequences to the private community once it is subjected
to a governmentally supervised program. Despite this, however, a privately
arbitrated resolution of several types of community association issues might
82. Community Dispute Services, Designed to Settle Personal Disagreements Quickly, Are
Expanding. Wall St.J., Oct. 27, 1978, at 48, col. 4.
83. Id. at col. 1-2.
84. ld.
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not be appropriate. For example, in architectural violation cases, why would
an arbitrator's decision about the aesthetic appropriateness of proposed
change be any more reasoned or "valid" than a decision made by those
people who actually live in the community? Why would an arbitrator be
better qualified than the people who live in the community to resolve issues
involving the timing or type of maintenance to be performed on the common
property as in the case of Country Club?
In both these type situations, or in other situations involving association
discretion, the association's elected officials are the proper parties to exercise
their sound business discretion. This, however, would not necessarily mean
that other issues might not be amenable to private arbitration. For example, a
question concerning the association's authority to act could be an appro-
priate question to arbitrate. Interpretation of covenant authority, however,
should not be left to those unfamiliar with community association principles
or law. Presently, in this relatively new field, there are not many versed in its
intricacies.
Even if certain association issues might be appropriately arbitrated, bind-
ing arbitration may be unsuitable in a community association. It might leave
both sides unhappy to impose a third party's decision on neighbors who must
interact in order for the community association to operate effectively. Alter-
natively, as in the case of the Boston Urban Court Program, mediation is
suitable in a community association because the association and its members
would resolve their disputes.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even though the historical record of homeowner operation of the modern-
day community association is short, it already is clear that the potential for
interpersonal conflict within these associations is great. Some community
association disputes inevitably will wind up in court. Judicial involvement in
these cases, therefore, poses a prime opportunity for the courts to create
justifiable and reasoned precedent to assist associations in resolving their
disputes without continued litigation. Giving deference to the reasoned deci-
sions of elected association representatives by limiting review of official deci-
sions to questions of power, abuse of power or discretion, and protection of
constitutional rights, should be a first step by the judiciary. Likewise, courts
should refrain from reviewing community association disputes until the
association has attempted resolution internally. This internal process should
include a hearing with at least minimal due process protection. Coupling
these principles with the legislated clean-up of problem provisions in con-
dominium statutes likewise would assist dispute resolution. Lastly, a profes-
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sional understanding by those working with community associations that the
community association and its membership interest are collective could be the
stepping stone to allowing the people themselves to arrive at reasoned,
meditated resolutions to their community association disputes.
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